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ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN ROMAN ALEXANDRIA: 








The aim of this article is to offer a new approach to the study of the riots in 
Alexandria in 38 CE. This riot is one of the better attested outbreaks of 
mass urban violence from antiquity. Yet, in spite of the weight of 
scholarship, the rioting remains a puzzle. The article argues that rather 
than seeing the riots as a function of deep-seated hostility between Greek 
and Jewish communities or as a dispute over citizenship rights, we need to 
see the riot as embedded within the urban sociology of Alexandria. A close 
reading of the literary accounts points to the importance of associations in 
the organisation of the riots. The article argues that the associations were 
integrated with the Alexandrian political elite through large social 
networks, to which the Jews had limited access. Alexandrian politics 
centred on competing networks. These networks allowed a community of 
interest to develop between elites and lower class members of the network. 
In explaining how that competition might have encouraged extreme 
violence, the article deploys a range of comparative examples concerning 
the operation of such networks and extreme civil violence. In a similar 
fashion to several of the referenced cases, I argue that the Alexandrian 
violence resulted from a political crisis which allowed both elite and street-
level political agents to mobilise violent support in pursuance of their 
individual interests. The result was to polarise the city and set the 
conditions for the subsequent decades of violence.  
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My aim in this article is to offer a new approach to the study of the 
riots in Alexandria in 38 CE. Philo’s In Flacc. and Leg. together with 
Claudius’ ‘Letter to the Alexandrians’ (P. Lond. 1912) and the Acta 
Alexandrinorum mean that it is one of the better attested outbreaks 
of mass urban violence from antiquity.1 Yet, in spite of the weight of 
scholarship, the rioting remains a puzzle and its proximate and 
underlying causes are a matter of debate.  
The outbreaks of large-scale inter-communal violence in 
Alexandria from 38 CE onwards demand an explanation rooted in 
the sociology of the city. Our problem, one common to historians of 
antiquity, is the paucity of data from which we can reconstruct that 
urban sociology. As a result, we are bound to turn to comparative 
data. In a recent article, Atkinson (2006) drew on parallels from 
‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and football violence to explore 
an urban sociology of violence. I utilise a different set of paradigms 
drawn from a range of studies of modern inter-communal ethnic 
conflicts. I regard these instances as a ‘better fit’ largely because the 
Alexandrian violence was evidently closely connected to state 
politics. These instances stress the importance of competition 
between members of differentiated large socio-economic networks. 
Such networks wished to gain access to and control of the benefits 
provided by state institutions and became violent in that com-
petition.  
The advantages of such a model are various. In the first instance, 
it embeds our understanding of Alexandrian violence within the 
operation of social networks for which we have some corroborating 
evidence and which would have had an immediate and everyday 
claim on the loyalty of the urban population. By contrast, 
explanations that emphasise ethnic motivations have to establish 
why such factors would have had motivating force for the urban 
population when ethnic conflict does not seem to have been a 
substantial element in urban violence in other ancient 
communities. Secondly, my approach renders secondary the 
difficult issues of Alexandrian citizenship with which much of the 
scholarship has wrestled.2 The problem that such explanations face 
                                                     
1 For texts and editions of the Acta, see Harker 2008:179–211. 
2 Compare Kerkeslager 2006. 
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is whether people would really slaughter their neighbours over a 
lack of clarity in the law. It seems sensible to assume that there was 
an underlying issue.  
We can also avoid a drift into an ‘essentialist’ position which 
would see cities of mixed ethnicities as inherently divided and 
combustible.3 An ‘essentialist’ model of ethnic conflict fails to 
explain why the situation in Alexandrian worsened in the mid first 
century CE or why ethnic conflict is not such a notable feature in 
the sociology of other Roman imperial cities. A network approach 
allows for the attested ethnic prejudice against Jews without 
postulating a vitriolic antisemitism familiar from modernity.  
Viewing the conflict as one between competitive networks allows 
us to identify the relationship to the Roman state and its 
representatives as the element which raised stakes in the 
competition and thereby encouraged its manifestation in large-scale 
violence. In my view, such an approach brings us closer to Philo’s 
narrative of the violence in which he represents the violence as 
emerging in the everyday circumstances of the city and in a failure 
of the Roman authorities.  
I begin by treating traditional approaches to the violence which 
see it as manifestation of ethnic tension or a legal-constitutional 
crisis. I read these approaches against Philo’s account, which reports 
the legal issues not as a cause of the violence but as an element 
through which the persecution of the Jews was manifested. In the 
second section, I engage in a close examination of Philo’s narrative.  
Philo is, of course, an engaged reporter of these events, whose 
friends and family likely suffered in the violence. One would no 
more expect an objective account from Philo than one would of 
other victims of ethnic violence. Philo’s account has polemical 
elements and is complex in its literary forms: it conforms to a Jewish 
tradition of historical-religious writing in which a narrative arc of 
                                                     
3 Haas 1997:1–14 provides a nuanced view of the competition between 
groups and how that might spill over into violence. In the older view of 
Tcherikover 1957:5, separation is natural and paralleled by modern 
instances. 
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persecution, redemption, and the repentance of the persecutor is 
followed.4 
Philo depicts the attack on the Jews as an irrational act. Yet the 
sequence of events hints at a political logic and a sociological basis 
for the violence, particularly in relation to the importance of 
associations. We may be sceptical of his interpretations and 
attitudes, but even if it is unlikely that opponents would have 
agreed with his account, Philo’s portrayal was likely a plausible, if 
tendentious, representation of Alexandrian society. 
 In the third section, I engage in a comparative study. The 
purpose is to provide historical instances of the circumstances in 
which competing socio-political networks developed strong ethnic 
identities and deployed extreme violence. I consider ‘pathways’ by 
which societies which have at their political centre large social 
networks move from competition between networks to ethnic 
violence and how ethnicity can become central to the operation of 
the state. These models help us re-imagine the processes by which 
Roman Alexandria moved from ethnic divisions and tensions to 
ethnic violence.  
In the final section, I return to a narrative of the violence of 38 
CE to explore the link between elite political crisis and street-level 
politics. I argue that an identity of interest emerged between 
elements of the Alexandrian political elite and elements of the 
Alexandria populace which encouraged that populace to violence, 
partly as a means of securing victory in their localised competition 
and partly as an exercise in reinforcing their identity and control in 
the city. Such violence is as much about generating a communal 
group as it is about destroying a group perceived as oppositional.  
 
Ethnicity and Constitutionalism 
 
Modern scholars writing about the events of 38 CE are willing to use 
terms such as ‘pogrom’ or ‘antisemitism’, usually with caution and 
aware of the specific historical associations of the terms. It is a 
tendency that dates to at least the first decade of the twentieth 
                                                     
4 See below and Alston 1997 for a comparison with 3 Maccabees.  
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century.5 Tcherikover and Fuks (1959:25) reference the ‘“Jewish 
question” in the modern sense of the term’ as emerging in the early 
imperial period. Van der Horst’s commentary on the In Flacc. 
describes the events as ‘the first pogrom’, but also states (2003:19) 
that ‘the pogroms are entirely different from what happened in 
Alexandria’. Schäfer’s (1997) study of anti-Jewish statements in 
Classical writers employs ‘Judeophobia’, though he writes (6–7) that 
‘I have no reservation about using the term “anti-semitism” despite 
its obvious anachronism’.6  
Classical consciousness of ethnic difference and consequent 
prejudice is not unique to the Jewish-Greek-Roman encounter, but 
the relative absence of ethnic conflict makes tempting a reliance on 
Jewish ‘exceptionality’ as an explanation.7 Kasher (1985) points to 
the slightness of the evidence (essentially Claudius’ ‘Letter to the 
Alexandrians’ and a fragmentary draft petition C.P.Jud. 2.151) that 
could be read as suggesting any Jewish desire for assimilation. 
Jewish difference was established by a separate politeia of the Jews 
and some cultural and spatial differentiation, in particular with 
regard to the treatment of women.8 That separation has been seen 
as sparking xenophobic and violent reactions.9 
All expressions of ethnic identity involve a measure of separation 
and differentiation. Yet, even as Philo’s writings represent and 
reinforce Jewish separation and adherence to different customs and 
laws, they, especially in his allegorical reading of Biblical texts, show 
a deep familiarity with Greek culture and philosophy and a 
commitment to Judaism as a form of universal learning.10 His family 
                                                     
5 Wilcken 1909; Staehelin 1905; Bell 1941; cf. Tcherikover 1957. 
6 See also Sevenster 1975; Feldman 1993. I prefer here to use ‘anti-Jewish’ to 
avoid assimilation of this episode to outbreaks of violence in later periods 
which were underpinned by the varied ideologies of antisemitism. I also 
avoid using ‘Greek’ to describe the perpetrators of the violence since this 
seems to prejudge the divisions as primarily ethnic.  
7 Simon 1986:286; Tcherikover 1979; Fraser 1972:57–58. 
8 Philo, Special Laws 3.173–75; Quaestiones in Genesim 4.15; In Flacc. 86–91; 
Alston 1997; Sly 1990. 
9 For Philo’s separateness, see Mendelson 1988 and discussion below.  
10 The bibliography for this question is enormous. See, for example, 
Birnbaum 1996 for Philo as a universalist and the balanced account in 
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are an obvious example of a successful Jewish engagement with the 
gentile world.11 The documentary record of the Roman period and 
the difficult of confidently identifying Jews within it suggest that the 
cultural boundaries that separated Jews from their fellow 
Alexandrians were frequently crossed.12 
The core question is not, however, one of the degree of 
separation, but how any difference was politicised and rendered 
violent. Such violence can be explained as a performance of racial 
ideologies through which a racial-ethnic identity for the community 
is asserted and enforced. Philip Gourevitch (1988) talking of the 
violence in Rwanda observed that ‘genocide, after all, is an exercise 
in community building’ and Arjan Appadurai (2006:7), focused on 
South Asia, argues that modern ethnic violence ‘may be seen as part 
of an emerging repertoire of efforts to produce previously 
unrequired levels of certainty about social identity, values, survival 
and dignity’. For Late Antique Alexandria, Christopher Haas 
(1997:12) offers a similar model in which competition between 
pagans and Jews, Jews and Christians, pagans and Christians, and 
Christians and Christians escalated into civic violence as ‘a means of 
reasserting some threatened aspect of the traditional social, political 
and religious order’ which was perceived as essential to the 
hegemony of a particular community. But although one could 
plausibly see the Christian violence of the fourth century as 
‘community-building’ and a response to a theological need for 
homogeneity, a more complex explanation is needed for a 
                                                                                                                      
Termini 2009. On the literary/philosophical discussions, see, exempli 
gratia, the essays collected in Runia and Sterling 1997 and Lévy 1998; 
Winter 2002; Birnbaum 2001. Dyck 2002 sees Philo’s philosophical method 
as an assimilation to Greek culture that replicated his socio-cultural and 
political assimilation. 
11 See the discussion and further references in Turner 1954, Schwartz 2009 
and Sly 1996. See also Honigman 1997. 
12 See the discussion in Bohak 2002, who argues that Jewish settlers in the 
Hellenistic disapora quickly assimilated, and Baslez 2017 for community 
celebrations in Alexandria that crossed the ethnic divide. See Honigman 
2009 for Jewish strategies of differentiation and assimilation in various 
communities of Ptolemaic Egypt.  More generally, see Gruen 2009 for 
Jewish exogamy and the survey in Rajak 1992. 
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perception of threat that might spark the anti-Jewish violence of the 
first century.   
That further element has been found in the relationship between 
Alexandria and Rome. This has been discussed extensively, with 
attention focusing on two key issues, the lack of traditional political 
institutions in Roman Alexandria and Alexandrian citizenship.13 Bell 
(1941) argued influentially that Alexandrian anti-Jewish feeling was, 
in fact, a cover for anti-Roman feeling.14  
This view depends heavily on texts of the Acta Alexandrinorum 
which link attacks on the emperor with anti-Jewish statements, 
some of which reference Jewish Alexandrian citizenship.15  Harker 
(2008:179-211) lists 73 likely texts of Acta found across Egypt. Most of 
those fragments make no mention of Jews. The Acta, which focus 
on conflict between Alexandrian community leaders and tyrannical 
Romans, are unusual literary representations of the relationship 
between Rome and a provincial city. Harker argues that they should 
be seen as widely dispersed dissident literary works which, whatever 
their underlying historical context, were largely fictional.16 
Tcherikover also read the Acta as fictional and supported the 
contemporary academic consensus that the antisemitism of the 
texts was secondary to their dissident nature.17 Yet it remains 
unclear why in 38 CE anti-Roman feeling would manifest as anti-
                                                     
13 Delia 1991; Kasher 1985. 
14 Compare the summary in Smallwood 1976:224–50. 
15 Most importantly, C.P. Jud. 2.155, which references a foreigner receiving 
citizenship; C.P. Jud. 2. 156, an account of the trial of Isidoros before 
Claudius which in (b) relates antisemitic insults levied by Isidoros against 
Agrippa and Claudius, and (c) brings up the tax status of Jews and their 
supposed difference from Alexandrians (see the new edition in Magnani 
2009); C.P. Jud 2. 157 in which an interview with Trajan about the Jews 
turns into an attack on the supposed Jews in his council; C. P. Jud. 2.158 
16 Gambetti 2008 argues that some of the texts may have been genuine 
accounts of trials.  
17 Tcherikover and Fuks 1959:57–59, with further references. 
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Jewish violence and further why the Roman authorities failed to 
understand that connection.18 
One explanation is to view the violence as defending the 
exclusivity of Alexandrian citizenship from Jews’ attempts to claim 
equality or citizenship.  Sandra Gambetti (2009) relates the violence 
to issues of citizenship and status:  
 
The Greeks attacked … either the enfranchised Jews, because they 
did not want the Jews to share in their full political privileges, or the 
Jews seeking citizenship, because they did not want the Jews to 
acquire it. (Gambetti 2009:9) 
 
She argues that the concern was given prominence by a census held 
by Flaccus which raised questions about Jewish privileges.19  
Debates over access to citizenship and related privileges might 
entail a need for the ‘previously unrequired levels of certainty about 
social identity, values, survival and dignity’ identified by Appadurai 
(2006:7) as a cause for ethnic violence. It is also evident that the 
citizenship status of the Jews became an issue of a polemic, to which 
Josephus, Contra Apionem, is our best insight.  
Nevertheless, although citizenship became a crux in a debate 
about Jewish status, citizenship disputes do not appear to have been 
the primary cause of the ethnic violence in 38 CE. In Claudius’ 
‘Letter to the Alexandrians’ (P.Lond. 1912 = C.P.Jud. 153), the 
emperor writes round the issues of conflict, perhaps 
characteristically (Griffin 1990). He fails to tell us what the 
Alexandrian ambassadors, and especially Dionysios of Theon (lines 
74-76), actually said. The most explicit statements relate to the 
preservation of rights established by Augustus (lines 86-87), 
attendance at gymnasial games (lines 93-94), the enjoyment of 
social ‘goods’ in ‘a foreign city’ (line 95), and an injunction not to 
bring more Jews from Syria or Egypt. Claudius asserts that the Jews 
of the city do not belong there, but that the existing community had 
                                                     
18 See Smallwood 1976:233–34, who sees the attack on the Jews not as anti-
semitism but a covert attack on Rome, but fails to explain why the Romans 
failed to defend their ‘protégés’.  
19 Gambetti 2008:11–12 wishes to differentiate her analysis from essentialist 
views which would see the conflict as inherent to a multi-ethnic city. 
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rights which should be protected. He makes no explicit mention of 
citizenship.  
Discussion of citizenship features in the Legatio ad Gaium, but 
only as a secondary issue. In Philo’s report of the ambassadors’ 
interview, Gaius centres the discussion on Jewish religious customs, 
particularly in relation to the difficulties the Jews had with the 
imperial cult. Towards the end of the audience, he asks the 
ambassadors about their citizenship (363). The phrasing does not 
suggest any attempt of the Jews to claim Alexandrian citizenship, 
rather a defence of their traditional rights and privileges. The 
discussion fails to progress and is brought to an end by Gaius (367).  
In the same work, Philo discusses citizenship in relation to 
Augustus’ treatment of the Jews in Rome. He claims that Augustus 
saw no incompatibility between their Roman and Jewish citizenship 
(157). What is meant by ‘politeia’ in this context is open to debate. It 
seems likely that some of the discussion related to manumitted 
Jewish slaves who likely had Roman citizenship. But if their Roman 
citizenship can be understood, it is not clear what is meant by 
‘Jewish’ citizenship. In the immediate context, the exercise of 
‘citizenship’ is related to rights of peaceful residence in Rome, 
adherence to native customs, maintenance of synagogues, the 
holding of the Sabbath, education in (Jewish) philosophy, and the 
sending of money to Jerusalem (155-56). Philo’s description cannot 
be reduced to legal formality and seems closer to ‘community 
membership’ than any specified legal identity. His rhetorical point 
was to draw a parallel between the rights of the Jews in Rome under 
Augustus and the violation of parallel rights in Alexandria.  
 The Legatio sets the references to citizenship in two specific 
contexts: the relationship with Roman imperial power, which in 
these dramatic circumstances centred on the institution of a statue 
of Gaius into the Temple, and the situation of the Jews in Alexandria 
and their violent exclusion from the spaces of the city.20 Although 
one imagines that legal issues formed part of the ambassadorial 
brief, the Legatio is not making that case. The argument is about the 
capacity of the Jewish community to remain loyal to Rome and their 
long-recognised rights to peaceful enjoyment of privileges of 
                                                     
20 For the spatial aspects of the violence, see Alston 1997. 
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residence and to follow their traditional religious and cultural 
customs.  
In this regard, the Legatio is similar to the fuller discussion of the 
issues in the In Flaccum. In that work, there are just three passages 
which directly reference the issue of citizenship. The In Flaccum 
opens seemingly following on from a narration of the anti-Jewish 
activities of Sejanus, which could hardly have been focused on 
Jewish citizenship in Alexandria.21 It is not until 53-54, more than a 
quarter of the way through, that the issue of citizenship is raised in 
reporting an edict that declared the Jews ‘foreigners and 
immigrants’. That edict came after the procession mocking Agrippa 
(36-39) and the desecration of the synagogues (40-41). The edict is 
understood as signalling official approval of anti-Jewish violence 
and it encouraged an intensification of that violence in the 
confining of the community to the Delta quarter and the looting of 
Jewish workshops and houses (55-57).  In chapters 78-80, the 
leaders of the Jewish community are beaten after the manner of 
Egyptians. One might see this as a reference to the issue of 
citizenship, but it is treated as a dishonour and an act of violence in 
parallel to the subsequent invasion of Jewish houses (86-91) and 
abuse of Jewish women (95-96). Finally, Philo gives Flaccus a 
confessional in which he regrets his decision to declare the Jews 
foreign when in reality they were settlers with rights (αὐτοῖ ς 
ἐπιτί μοις οὖσι κατοί κοις), words which one imagines were carefully 
chosen (172). This is but one of many instances of Flaccus’ regret. 
Philo expresses these instances in language compatible with the 
legal and institutional separation of the Jewish Alexandrian 
community from Alexandrian (Greek) citizens and with a narrative 
in which the Jewish community were attempting to maintain rights 
which were different to those of Alexandrian citizens.  
To see the argument in 38 CE as being primarily about 
citizenship requires a radical departure from Philo’s accounts, 
                                                     
21 Eusebius HE 2.5 attests five Philonic books dealing with the persecution 
of the Jews under Gaius. The attestation does not require us to imagine a 
single coherent work. One could postulate a sequence of different works 
concerned with the events. Other than the opening connective sentence, 
the In Flacc. appears to be self-contained. 
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which one could only explain on the presumption that Philo was 
being deliberately obfuscatory. In the absence of plausible evidence 
for Jewish infringement of Alexandrian citizenship rights, it is 
difficult to imagine, even in the deeply irrational world of ethnic 
violence, that the riots were sparked by a need to establish a clearer 
legal separation between Jewish Alexandrians and Alexandrian 
citizens. The status and rights of Jewish Alexandrians played their 
part in the rhetoric of violence in 38 CE, but they seem consequent 
on that violence, not its cause. Both accounts focus on Jews’ rights 
to peacefully enjoy the social ‘goods’ in their communities, which 
include adherence to their own traditional customs, such as the 
maintenance of synagogues and the honouring of the Temple. Philo 
shows repeatedly that such enjoyments had in the past been seen as 
entirely compatible with loyalty to or membership of the Roman 
political community. The assault on legal rights should be taken as 
subsidiary to the issues that drove the conflict.   
Yet, if we decide that the antipathies that led to the riot of 38 CE 
were not embedded in conflict over citizenship nor anti-Roman 
feeling nor in a primordial ethnic hostility, we are left without 
plausible motivation. Philo also avoids providing us with a motive. 
Instead, he attributes the violence to an irrational mob. Atkinson’s 
(2006) response to this aporia is to focus on proximate causes, 
suggesting that the ‘precious little’ that sparked the violence was 
Agrippa’s visit to the city, which is in keeping with Philo’s accounts. 
We are familiar with sudden outbreaks of inter-communal violence 
from multiple modern instances and these are also often attributed 
to irrational mobs. But when such outbreaks are investigated they 
can be shown to have a sociological basis and a political logic. There 
is every reason to believe that the Alexandrian riots would have 
been similar. If Philo does not give us the political rationality, his 
narrative provides clues as to the sociological basis of the violence.  
 
Philo’s narrative, urban sociology and the associations of 
Roman Alexandria 
 
In this section, I begin with a summary of the narrative in the In 
Flaccum. I use this analysis to identify the crucial role played in that 
narrative by the Alexandrian associations. The section then focuses 
12 
on those associations and their place within Alexandrian culture. I 
see the associations as linking the Alexandrian population with elite 
groups and city institutions, such as the gymnasium and the Temple 
of Sarapis. They functioned as institutional elements in social 
networks from which, for a variety of reasons, Jews were likely 
excluded. I argue that the violence should be understood as being 
between social networks within Alexandria which was propelled by 
conflicts in the highest political echelons, with which Philo’s 
narrative begins.  
According to the In Flaccum, after the loss of patrons in Rome, 
Flaccus, a previously efficient governor, was corrupted (1-19):  ‘the 
ruler became the governed, and the governed became governors’ 
(19). Three leaders of the Alexandrians, Dionysios, Lampo, and 
Isidoros offered to use their influence to intercede on Flaccus’ 
behalf with the emperor (20-23). Their price was the Jews. Rather 
than rejecting their overtures as promising civil war, Flaccus 
covertly supported them by favouring non-Jews in legal cases (24). 
Jewish celebrations on the visit of Agrippa (25-32) provoked a 
counter demonstration (33-34), which Flaccus did not suppress (35). 
A further demonstration followed, starting in the gymnasium, in 
which Karabas was given the role of Agrippa (36-39). Once more 
Flaccus did not act (40). The crowd then called upon Flaccus to 
install the imperial image in synagogues (41-42), which Flaccus 
allowed (43). This crime receives extended treatment (45-52). At 
this point Flaccus revoked the rights of the Jewish community (53-
54).  
Following the decree, attacks on Jewish property began (54) and 
the Jews were driven into one part of one of the quarters of the city 
(55-57). Jews were robbed, starved, and sometimes murdered (57-
71). Jewish sympathizers, described as ‘friends and relations’ (φί λοι 
καὶ  συγγενεῖ ς), were also punished and imprisoned (72).22 Flaccus 
                                                     
22 The same non-Jewish sympathisers are identified in 64 as sources of food 
and protection, which echoes a reference in 60 to ‘friends and relations’ 
who might ransom captives. Their presence in the narrative shows that 
there was a porous social boundary between the Jewish community and 
others in the city and that ties across that boundary survived the inter-
communal violence. 
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returns to the story with his order for the arrest of members of the 
gerousia, three of whom Flaccus attempted to reconcile before 
submitting the entire gerousia to beatings (73-80). Other 
punishments, including crucifixions, were inflicted on members of 
the community (81-85). Flaccus sent soldiers into Jewish houses to 
search for arms (86-91). Jewish women were attacked and 
humiliated in the theatre (95-96). Then, Flaccus was arrested and 
removed from the city (108). 
In spite of a clearly fictional account that Philo gives us of a 
conspiracy between Flaccus and Isidoros, Lampo, and Dionysios, 
two of whom, Lampo and Isidoros, were to be instrumental in the 
eventual condemnation of Flaccus (128-45), there was no obvious 
leadership in the initial stages of the violence.23 In fact, it seems 
likely that Isidoros, whom Philo seems to identify as the main 
source of hatred, was in Rome at the time.24 But rather than 
weakening Philo’s argument, his absence reinforces Philo’s claim 
that the violence stemmed from an ‘innate’ Egyptian hatred of Jews 
and from malice or envy (29).25 It was the ‘mob’ that led the 
demonstrations against Agrippa (33, 35) and later campaigned for 
the introduction of images into the synagogues (41). The violent 
domination of the city is described as ochlocracy (65).  
Yet, Philo envisages a social organisation of that mob. Early in 
the text (4), Flaccus is praised for banning the hetaireiai and 
sunodoi (ἑταιρεί ας καὶ  συνόδους) which seem to have been 
religious feasting clubs.26 Towards the conclusion of the work, Philo 
returns to such groups in his condemnation of Isidoros. Isidoros is 
described as a ‘man of the mob’ (ἄνθρωπος ὀχλικός), an enemy of 
‘peace and tranquillity’ and a fomenter of riots and civil 
disturbances (135) who kept close to him a disorderly mob, which he 
ordered into an equivalence of military divisions. There is an 
obvious discrepancy in Philo’s description of the mob as being 
disordered and having a quasi-military organisation.  He offers an 
analysis of the associations (θί ασοι). He denies that these are 
                                                     
23 See Sherwin White 1972. 
24  As pointed out by Kerkeslager 2005. 
25 There is a textual corruption at this point but the meaning seems clear. 
26 See Arnauotoglou 2005 on Flaccus and the Roman ban on such groups.  
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primarily religious organisations, seeing them as drinking societies. 
They are called sunodoi and klinai (σύνοδοι καὶ  κλῖ ναι) (136). 
Isidoros had, according to Philo, a leadership position in many of 
these groups and Philo accords him the titles of sumposiarch, 
klinarch, and Frightener of the City (ὁ συμποσί αρχος, ὁ κλινάρχης, 
ὁ ταραξί πολις) (137).  
Such groups are well-attested in Roman Egypt. They operated as 
trade groups and religious associations and are identified through a 
diversity of vocabulary which probably reflects their heterogeneity.27 
We have a number of ‘constitutions’ of village trade guilds from the 
Fayum villages.28 These groups feasted regularly, creating social 
bonds alongside their trade relations that integrated village traders 
with their metropolitan counterparts. The feasts were conducted 
under the auspices of the village or city temple which provided 
dining facilities.29 Such associations combined religious and social 
functions and it seems entirely credible that their gatherings might 
involve excessive alcohol consumption.  
Sofia Torallas Tovar (2017) links the Alexandrian associations to 
the worship of Dionysos, pointing out that in 3 Maccabees the 
conflict in the Alexandrian community is imagined as being one 
between the worshippers of Dionysos and the Jews. Tovar argues 
that the Jews regarded themselves as being in competition with a 
mystery cult, which partially explains the oddity of the conflict 
being constructed in terms of competing monotheistic groups. She 
connects the crucial role of drunkenness in the narrative to 
Dionysos. Additionally, in an Alexandrian context Dionysos is to be 
identified with Sarapis, the city god of Alexandria who was also 
associated with the Ptolemaic dynasty. 3 Maccabees thus narrates a 
conflict between the followers of the Jewish god and of the patron 
god of Alexandria and the Ptolemies. Since worship of Dionysos-
Sarapis could be construed as a performance of loyalty to the regime 
                                                     
27 For Egyptian associations, see San Nicolo 1972; for elsewhere in the East, 
see Van Nijf 1997. 
28 P.Mich. 5. 243–248, on which see Boak 1937. 
29 See Youtie 1948 and Montserrat 1992 for invitations to dine at the 
temple. For more detailed discussion of the relationship between public 
dining and the temple, see Alston 2002:208–14. 
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and city, the Jews’ inability to participate in such rituals was 
susceptible to hostile interpretation.  
The link with Sarapis can also be seen in a fictional account of a 
tense meeting between Isidoros, Theon, Flaccus, a mysterious ‘old 
man’, and an Aphrodisia in the Temple of Sarapis (P.Oxy. 8.1089 = 
CPapJud 2.154) in which a considerable amount of money exchanged 
hands. The location of the interchange evidently had political and 
religious resonances which are difficult to reconstruct. 
If, as seems likely, the associations of Alexandria dined in 
worship of Sarapis, it would have been difficult for a devout Jew to 
participate in those meals. It is thus no surprise that, as Baslez 
(2017) notes, the reconciliation of Jews and Alexandrians in 3 
Maccabees centres on communal feasting, which brings Jew and 
Alexandrian together away from the Temple. Philo’s attack on the 
associations was not just an assault on drunkenness and lower-class 
disorder, but on social institutions which likely excluded Jews and 
hence contributed to community polarisation. Yet, since the 
worship of Sarapis appears likely to have functioned symbolically 
and socially to unite (elements of) the urban population, elite and 
non-elite, the sunodoi and klinai could be seen, contrary to Philo, as 
community-building institutions. In such an interpretation, the 
Jews’ exclusion from such associations becomes more significant.  
Philo’s description of the associations does not lead him to a 
discussion of anti-Jewish sentiment, but to an account of an earlier 
demonstration held in the gymnasium against Flaccus (138-45). 
Flaccus’ subsequent investigation produced ‘evidence’ that the 
demonstrators were paid, which is seen as the only plausible reason 
why the poor of Alexandria might be mobilised against their prefect 
and this may provide the context for the ban mentioned in In 
Flaccum 4. Philo’s inclusion of this story, out of chronological 
sequence, argues for Isidoros and his associations being a danger to 
the city since the ‘mob’ could be mobilised against the city’s 
political hierarchy, including its Roman elements. 
We need not accept Philo’s characterisation of the rioters as a 
drunken mob of what the Victorians would have call ‘the 
undeserving poor’. The involvement of the associations suggests a 
class of persons at least sufficiently wealthy to pay the association 
fees, though one would expect that the membership included 
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categories of persons significantly poorer than the elite. Similarly, 
there is no evidence to assess how far up the social and economic 
scale membership would stretch, nor what proportion of the 
population would have been members of such groups: how many 
people does it take to riot?  The associations provided an 
institutionalised network that would allow the political integration 
of different socio-economic groups within the city. Through the 
associations the membership was connected both to the city temple 
and, in Philo’s narrative, to the gymnasium. One might imagine 
(and we have little other than imagination to work with) that in a 
city like Alexandria, the membership of the associations gave voice 
to political agents from outside the elite.  
The direct political and financial benefits for the lower classes in 
engaging with Isidoros and his ilk are not stated. This may be 
because Philo, like other aristocratic authors, did not concern 
himself with the political rationality or interests of the lower orders. 
Membership of the mob might have provided a sense of belonging 
to a wider community; it is possible that Isidoros or other 
prominent Alexandrians directly subsidised the associations, as 
Philo suggests. It is likely that the social network provided the 
connections and social knowledge that enabled the everyday 
processes of living and trading in the city and the access to higher 
level political players which was essential in the resolution of 
disputes and administrative difficulties (see the next section). Such 
networks provide a possible link through which we can understand 
an identity of interest between the Alexandrian lower orders and 
city-level political players.  
The upper echelons of these hierarchic networks were connected 
to Rome. The currency of such connections was status. The 
Alexandrians were expected to recognise and respect Roman status 
hierarchies. Romans, both in Egypt and Rome itself, were expected 
to recognise and honour Alexandrian status markers. The long list 
of ambassadors in Claudius’ Letter to the Alexandrians (P.Lond. 1912) 
can be seen as a recognition of status and a reflection of an 
important political exchange. The Acta Isidori (CPapJud. 156), by 
contrast, shows the failure of such an exchange when in the Cairo 
recension (156d), Isidoros is made to respond to a Claudian insult by 
proclaiming himself the ‘gymnasiarch of the glorious city of 
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Alexandria’ before impugning the parentage of emperor.30 
Gymnasial office in Alexandria is understood to generate status 
sufficient to demand recognition at the imperial court. The mutual 
failure to recognise status entails a breakdown of political relations. 
The Isidoros of the text may seem to us startlingly unwise in 
insulting Claudius, but his was a response to Claudius’ failure to 
honour his status and thus it was consequent on a collapse in 
normal political relations. 
This connection between imperial and Alexandrian networks can 
also be illustrated from an inscription from the theatre area at Kom 
el-Dikka in Alexandria (SEG 50.1563) honouring Tiberius Claudius 
Geminus, also called Isidorus, the son of Tiberius Claudius Isidorus, 
gymnasiarch. It lists the younger man’s offices as gymnasiarch, 
hypomnematographos, tribune, epistrategos of the Thebaid, and 
Arabarch. It seems likely that the elder gymasiarch was the Isidoros 
of the In Flaccum and the Acta.31 The ability of the son to prosper 
after the fall of the father would suggest that political status in the 
city rested on more than Roman recognition. Even if the 
identification is not accepted, the inscription shows that status 
passed down the family line and that a gymnasiarch was able to 
transition between Alexandrian positions and equestrian posts 
within the administration of Roman Egypt.   
The career of Tiberius Claudius Geminus is similar to the way in 
which members of Philo’s own family transcended local politics, 
culminating in Tiberius Iulius Alexander becoming first Prefect of 
Egypt and then Praetorian Prefect.32 Although one might demur 
from Lukaszewicz‘s (2000) assertion that the Acta Isidori were 
                                                     
30 For the Acta Isidori see the edition of Magnani 2009. For similar 
sentiments, see CPapJud 156b, II 42. 
31 The substantive issue in identifying the father with the gymnasiarch in 38 
CE relates to the award of citizenship. Tiberius Claudius Isidorus was 
presumably awarded citizenship by Claudius after 41 CE. Harker 2008:14 
regards it as implausible that Claudius could have awarded him 
citizenship, executed him (probably in the same year), and subsequently 
promoted his son. I am not persuaded that this is an implausible sequence. 
32 For Iulius Alexander, see Turner 1954. One can compare the 
distinguished careers of those who were Alexandrian ambassadors to 
Claudius in 41. See Kayser 2003 and the summary in Harker 2008:19–21. 
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‘based on genuine documents’, the depiction of a gymnasiarch 
operating within the highest political echelons of Rome was in itself 
realistic.  
Such connections evidently brought political power to the 
individual from which would flow the ability to benefit one’s friends 
and harm one’s enemies. Indeed, the In Flaccum embeds this 
political principle within the plot since Flaccus was left vulnerable 
by the fall of his friends in Rome and consequently reliant on figures 
in the Alexandrian aristocracy to deliver support and protection (16-
23). Kushnir-Stein (2000) argues that the conflict was sparked by 
the fear that Agrippa was acting as intermediary for the Jews at the 
imperial court and thereby marginalising Flaccus. Agrippa offered 
the Jewish groups, perhaps largely excluded from the social 
networks headed up by Isidoros and friends, possible access to 
imperial power, but also potentially isolated Isidoros and the 
network associated with him. We can understand the 
demonstrations and counter-demonstrations that followed 
Agrippa’s arrival in the city fresh from the imperial court (28-35) as 
competition between networks, both of which wished to advertise 
their connections to Rome.  
Philo’s narrative of an underlying conspiracy between Flaccus 
and the Alexandrians, whatever its historicity, makes sense in the 
context of the importance of political networks that could secure 
benefits and on which Flaccus himself relied. In such an 
understanding, the struggle revolves not around any ideology of 
antisemitism nor on issues of citizenship, but on securing a 
connection to the imperial court and the social and political 
benefits that flowed from that connection.  
   
A comparative account 
 
The aim of the prior sections has been to reconstruct a plausible 
sociology behind the violence in Alexandria. This sociology makes a 
connection between seemingly leaderless crowds and court politics. 
And yet, it is an enormous step from social and political 
competition and division to killing one’s neighbours. We lack 
detailed ethnographic material which would allow us to examine 
that transition, but we can employ comparative material.  
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In this section, I survey a range of work on social networks and 
civil violence, mostly drawn from African studies. I show first the 
importance of such networks in everyday life in some urban 
communities. These networks were linked to state-level actors who 
were able to use such networks as a mechanism of political control. 
I then discuss how these networks under certain circumstances 
deployed extreme violence. Further, although the networks may 
have had limited overlap with ethnic groups in a polity, in crises 
ethnicity has frequently been an element in social mobilisation. The 
instrumental use of ethnicity allows oppressors access to a 
justificatory language of ethnic exclusivity, writes violence into a 
normally false history of age-old ethnic hostility, and obscures 
immediate causal and motivational factors. This analysis provides us 
with an understanding of a possible pathway from often loose and 
overlapping social networks to extremes of ethnic violence. 
The choice of African comparators is potentially contentious. 
The examples cited are from societies which have significant 
cultural, historical, and economic differences and I reject any 
suggestion of an ‘African’ social form.33 One could, I suspect, draw 
on the literature of South Asian communal violence.34 Yet, my 
choice of examples can be excused in part because of that rich 
variety of African political experiences: parallels can be drawn from 
a wide range of states and historical situations. Further, we have a 
significant number of historical examples in which large social 
networks at first guaranteed power for a political group and then, in 
their breakdown, encouraged ethnic violence. There are also certain 
broad and recognised similarities, far from unique to African states, 
that make such states attractive as possible models. Several states 
shared a colonial legacy that influenced state formation. They 
operated with relative weak institutional structures independent of 
the state; ‘informal’ political and economic structures were often 
pervasive and a source of considerable social power. The relative 
poverty of the population made the populations more dependent on 
benefactions than, for instance, in Western European states. Finally, 
the colonial legacy often meant that states did not derive their 
                                                     
33 See the discussion in Chabal 1996. 
34 For an example, see the influential Appadurai 2006.  
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legitimacy from the consent of their citizens.35 This allowed some 
states to maintain predatory and violent institutions. Such 
conditions combined to generate what Mbembe (2001) named the 
postcolony, which he sees as a feature of sub-Saharan Africa.  
In several societies, sociologists have identified extensive social 
networks that operated to distribute social and economic benefits 
and to mobilise support. In the absence of a strongly-defined class 
basis for political organisation, such ‘patrimonial networks’ cement 
political power and, in certain circumstances, have organised 
violence.36 Individuals may have a high level of dependency on such 
networks for access to social, economic, and political resources. 
Importantly for our purposes, those networks operated well beyond 
a narrow political class and could build loyalties that allowed status 
and power to pass from generation to generation. I suggest that 
such large social networks were probably common across several 
historical societies, including those of antiquity. Further, the use of 
violence in the Roman imperial state and the concentration of 
power on the representatives of that state also make the parallels 
instructive for our Alexandrian instance.37 This is an issue which is 
further explored in the final section. 
The relationship between state and community networks is far 
from straightforward and requires that we make allowance for 
political agency and negotiation at all levels of the network. The 
importance of the socio-political network in everyday life is brought 
out in Salwa Ismail’s (2006) study of Bulaq al-Dakur, Cairo. She 
argues that in contrast to modern European political philosophy, 
which assumes a separation of authorities in state and society, in 
Bulaq al-Dakur governance is embedded within informal and local 
structures of social power. This ‘everyday’ government is pervasive 
and closely tied to state-level authorities who maintain an often 
vestigial but always predatory presence (xxxiii).  Informal and 
                                                     
35 Whatever the parallels with the post-partition Indian states, democracy 
has been fundamental to state building in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Sri Lanka, though all have had problems.  
36 Discussions in Bayart 1993; Chabal and Vidal 2007; Nugent 1995. 
37 Alston 2015 argues that such networks were crucial in establishing 
Augustan power. 
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formal structures operate alongside each other. Problems are solved 
through the intervention of ‘notables’ (19-40). Individuals survive by 
networks, which allow everyday needs to be met and pressures to be 
managed. But such networks also create problems. Individuals 
negotiate and compete within the networks and there is always the 
possibility of social fissures if negotiations fail to reach a consensual 
settlement. The predatory state exercises a measure of control 
through institutions such as the unlamented Gamal Mubarak’s 
‘charities’, and by repression of those groups which are or are seen 
as oppositional, such as the Islamicists (100-102).  
Francis de Boeck (1996) paints a similar picture of life in 
Kinshasa where the network has replaced the state as the 
hegemonic political and social structure. He argues that Western 
privileging of formal economic and political structures over 
informal networks is a fantasy. People rely on local and informal 
relations. Immigrants depend heavily on their pre-existing social 
connections which leads to clusters of people of the same origin in 
areas of the city. The complexity of the city means that:  
 
The concept of the state should be problematized and redefined in 
terms of a great number of political strategies… which aim at the 
creation of networks and spaces of contact, palaver, (asymmetric) 
exchange, solidarity and complicity, enabling the circulation of 
commodities, money and wealth. (De Boeck 1996:98). 
 
In the context of a weak state, the networks take on vestigial state 
functions. Such networks depend on fluidity and porous boundaries 
to negotiate collective social benefits and the success of any 
negotiation reinforces the status of the leadership of the networks. 
Those leaderships are encouraged to do business with each other. 
Competition is often between loose networks, which are centred on 
the ‘big-men’. Governments need to build political bases through 
alliances of networks while the ‘big men’ need access to 
governmental patronage and their peers within other networks so 
as to provide for their supporters and confirm their status.  
In such a system, political change shuffles the pack of ‘big-men’, 
but retains the operational structures. In Ghana, Nkrumah’s CPP 
brought down the ‘big-men’, but within a generation the ‘Verandah 
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Boys’ had become ‘big-men’ themselves, controllers of networks. 
Such links were institutionalised into old-boys associations and 
established broad and overlapping networks of privileged groups 
through which all aspects of state and business life could be 
manipulated.38  
In a state with very few resources, the benefits of state capture 
may be limited. But in most modern states the state has sufficient 
resources to empower and reward. Patrick Chabal’s (2007) 
discussion of Angola shows how oil contracts have been used by the 
MPLA to build a powerful patrimonial state. Christine Messiant 
(2007) argues that the primacy of the patrimonial state was such 
that the MPLA was able to negotiate the transition to multiparty 
politics without its hegemony being threatened. In such contexts, 
opposition entails exclusion from a state’s redistributive network. It 
is a failure of negotiation that would mean that that the leadership 
would be unable to support and reward their followers. As a tactic, 
it becomes rational only if exclusion is already a feature of the 
political system or to mobilise disaffected elements towards state 
capture.39 Such a system can generate long-term political stability: 
in Ghana it was only with the economic crisis in the 1970s, when the 
distributive networks contracted, that excluded groups came into 
being, in this case in universities and the army, which combined 
became sufficiently powerful to seize the state.40 
Ethnic divisions have been one way of asserting inclusion and 
exclusion. Instrumentally, ethnic divisions can enhance solidarities. 
They may allow junior members of a network to lay claims on 
‘representative’ power brokers and, similarly, allow powerful players 
to demand allegiance. 41 Lee Ann Fujii’s (2009) study of the genocide 
in Rwanda shows that although Rwandan politics had been violent 
from the 1950s and there had been a hardening of ethnic 
boundaries, even on the eve of the genocide such boundaries were 
traversed by numerous social ties, including marriage (59-74). Social 
negotiation survived ethnic tensions. Even as the genocide took 
                                                     
38 Nugent 1995. 
39 See the essays in Chabal and Daloz 1999.  
40 Nugent 1995; cf Reno 2006. 
41 Glickman and Furia 1995; Mozaffier 1995. 
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hold, some resisted and defended neighbourhood Tutsi. Much of 
the violence was top-down, generated by a militant group who 
located their political base solely in the Hutu community. They 
sought to build a ‘state’ network around the Hutu (123–37), which 
excluded the Tutsi and their leadership. The rhetoric of state-level 
actors worked as a ‘propulsion mechanism’ for multiple instance of 
local violence (125–36; 166–78). That violence was deployed as a 
means of resolving local conflicts and securing local power. Its 
extremity forced people to commit to local genocidal leaders and 
provided opportunities for such individuals to establish dominance, 
which was reinforced by connections to the political centre (12–13; 
136–78).42 The Rwandan genocide can be seen as an attempt by a 
small elite to create a monopolistic hold for their group on a state 
through the elimination of rival networks and the polarisation of 
the community. The full horror of the genocide depended on local 
actors identifying with the genocidal cause and finding an interest 
in supporting and performing local killings. The killings destroyed 
rivals and established new networks of loyalty and shared benefit. It 
was networking that rendered the violence pervasive. 
Paul Richards (1996) describes a similar dynamic in the vicious 
civil war in Sierra Leone. Sometimes read as a form of anti-modern 
tribalism (we might compare Philo’s representation of the violence 
in Alexandria),43 Richards (1996:8, 31–33) understands even the 
recruitment of child-soldiers as a strategy to break the power of 
established social networks operating in rural areas. The leaders of 
such established networks tended to exclude or exploit the young, 
leaving them vulnerable to the attractions of rebel networks with 
their own initiation rituals and ‘dramaturgy’ of membership.44 
Alongside building their own networks, the rebels sought to destroy 
traditional networks so as to deprive the local ‘big-men’ of their 
labour gangs.45 Richards (1996:61–2) blames a highly educated elite 
                                                     
42 One can compare the similar dynamics of civil violence in Greece under 
Nazi occupation and in the subsequent civil war: see Kalyvas 2006. 
43 See, for example, the controversial narrative in Kaplan 2001. 
44 Richards 1996:68; 103–4; 55–59; 81–2. One can compare this process of 
network formation with the development of militias in Congo: see 
Vlassenroot 2006 
45 Richards 2006. 
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in the rebel RUF for a strategic and highly rational deployment of 
extreme violence. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of ethnic instrumentalism in 
competition over a patrimonial network comes from Liberia. The 
pre-1980 Liberian state developed around a small Americo-Liberian 
elite. American multinational concessions enriched this elite, 
allowing it to extended redistributive networks into the indigenous 
communities, which were loosely grouped into villages and tribes. 
But as late as the 1970s tribal identity had little or no political 
importance.46 After the military coup of April 1980, the country slid 
into civil war. By 1993 seven armed factions were competing for 
control. Samuel Doe centred his faction on his tribal group, the 
Krahn, and following his military victory he enriched his allies. 
Since many other groups were excluded by this new ethnic politics, 
the regime was chronically unstable, reliant upon violent suppres-
sion and lavish distribution of resources. The reaction inevitably 
took on an ethnic hue and the rebel NPFL looted and killed their 
way through Monrovia.47 Ethnicity and the invention of ethnic 
markers were employed to shore up political and social networks 
and bind the members of those networks ever more closely to their 
leadership.48  
These sociological studies provide examples of escalations from 
social competition to large scale violence. Patrimonial networks 
integrated state and local actors. Social competition between 
networks could be managed through negotiation and could, indeed, 
generate a stable political system. But such systems could also fail 
catastrophically. Our examples illustrate possible mechanisms by 
which elite-level crises transform into seemingly leaderless local 
‘mob’ violence. In Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, national level 
crises acted as propulsion mechanisms for local actors to exercise 
extreme violence in local disputes to both win those disputes and 
establish connections to the state-level actors that confirmed their 
local power. Ethnic markers served as a crude mechanism of 
exclusion or inclusion in a network and although there was 
                                                     
46 Ellis 1999:31–2. 
47 Ellis 1999:49–118. 
48 Ellis 1999:201–21. 
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opposition to the attacks on neighbours, certainly in Rwanda (and 
one can compare Alexandria), the extremity of violence often 
suppressed other loyalties.  Membership of local gangs was 
reinforced by a dramaturgy of violence.49 Public victimisation of 
those outside the dominant network reinforced their excluded 
status and increased the risk for those actively opposing the 
violence.  Ethnicity was instrumental in these conflicts. There may 
have been pre-existing divisions, but in most cases there is no 
evidence of a significant ideology of racial or ethnic difference. In 
these cases, ethnic hostility was invented or enhanced to further the 
objectives of the political agents at both street and state level. As in 
our Alexandrian instance, extreme ethnic violence could develop 
without prior widespread racism.50 
The modern examples suggest that in a functioning system of 
patrimonial networks those at the top of the system, the ‘big-men’, 
depend on a system of negotiation and co-operation by which to 
deliver social benefits to their supporters. Outright opposition to 
the state is futile and potentially endangers the network: it signifies 
the failure of the network’s leadership. It also reflects a failure of the 
state to maintain balance. When negotiation breaks down, trouble 
begins since the options available to the leaderships become 
restricted. The breakdown might stem from any number of causes: 
the economic failure of the state or from a political failure. In an 
imperial situation, it might result from the imperial power 
becoming identified with one social element. In the final section, I 
return to Roman Alexandria to examine whether we can detect 
similar dynamics in that city. 
 
                                                     
49 Diouf 2003. 
50 This is, of course, why ‘antisemitism’ is a potentially misleading label in 
the Alexandrian case and why historical models derived from European 
racism may not apply. 
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Violent networks in Roman Alexandria 
 
In Roman Alexandria, although some benefits flowed from the state 
to the people in terms of offices and positions, it is difficult to 
imagine that these benefits were of a scale similar to those that have 
come from the capture of modern states by kleptocratic regimes.  
Yet, rather than thinking primarily in terms of the delivery of social 
benefits, under an illiberal or imperial regime, a state might rule 
through a threat of social harms. Under a potentially predatory 
state, all are rendered precarious. Jewish attempts to shore up their 
position through an appeal to imperial precedent and to Augustan 
treatment of the Jews (see above) can be seen as a rhetorical 
strategy to bind those who wielded imperial power. But ultimately it 
was political influence that provided security. Flaccus’ treatment of 
the Jews initially reminded them of their precarious status in the 
face of Roman power, but with the arrival of Agrippa, the Jews were 
presented with an alternative route to court, its power, influence, 
and security. The departure of Agrippa led to an intensification of 
the conflict. We can read that conflict as a brutal performance that 
demonstrated to the community their precarious status within the 
city and their dependence on the authorities, not for the provision 
of social benefits, but for the prevention of harms.  
Philo’s narrative points to a political crisis at the heart of 
Alexandria’s problems. Flaccus is made responsible for the violence. 
This is in spite of his evident passivity in the early stages of the 
outbreak. Philo identified his problematic behaviour as stemming 
from his dependence on persons within the city. Flaccus’ ensnaring 
by the Greeks meant that he failed in the traditional role of the 
Roman governor, which was to maintain impartiality, a role 
repeatedly represented in the rhetoric of Roman government.51 
Roman power guaranteed that no single local leadership group 
could establish a hegemony and worked to foster negotiation 
between subordinate groups. That negotiation was performed 
through the recognition of status. For the networks to function, 
leadership groups needed to recognise each other and to recognise 
and be recognised by Roman authority. This recognition was 
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performed through symbolic exchanges of honours and the flow of 
offices and benefits. Philo’s initial accusation against Flaccus, that 
he was hostile to the Jews in his decisions, is exactly the same as 
that made in the Acta Isidori in regard to the pro-Jewish bias of 
Claudius. Their different biases prevented them from acting 
impartially in a dispute between local networks and denied the 
legitimacy, expressed in terms of status, of one of those networks.  
While Flaccus was Prefect and thus representative of Roman 
power, the Jews had few options. But with the arrival of Agrippa, a 
new connection to Rome was established. The demonstrations for 
Agrippa displayed Jewish access to the imperial court. Flaccus’ 
actions delegitimised his rival, but also made those who supported 
him outsiders in the city. At the highest echelons, the dispute was 
over the networks that connected Alexandria to Rome.  
The transfer of this dispute from the circles around the prefect 
into street violence was a result of an integration of local and state-
level interests. Flaccus sought to shore up his political support by 
systematically weakening those he perceived as enemies. The 
crowds took to the streets to take collective and individual 
advantage. The branding of the Jews as oppositional likely 
functioned as a ‘propulsion mechanism’ for street violence in 
furtherance of local social and economic conflicts. Furthermore, 
both the demonstrations and the violence offered opportunities to 
one portion of the city to demonstrate their loyalty to Flaccus and 
to position themselves in relation to the Roman state. The violence 
was performative. It drew social and territorial boundaries;52 it was 
opportunistic; it was not indiscriminate. The parallels identified 
above have shown that outbreaks of ethnic violence do not depend 
on developed racism within a society or a long history of ethnic 
conflict, but can arise instrumentally, as persons seek to benefit 
from social and political division.  
Appadurai (2006: 10) notes that the violence of the Indian sub-
continent in the 1990s was ‘accompanied by a surplus of rage, an 
excess of hatred that produces untold forms of degradation and 
violation’. We could apply such descriptions to 38 CE. He attributes 
this rage to a desire to fix identity and power relations in a world 
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that is profoundly uncertain and ultimately beyond local control.53 
Similar uncertainties about their place in the empire, the way the 
power of that empire might be deployed in local politics, and the 
ability of local networks to influence and affect imperial power, 
were factors in Alexandria. We see them in the Acta 
Alexandrinorum, with their pervasive concern over status-
recognition and relations with imperial power. The violence 
functioned as a means of fixing the city’s politics, marginalising the 
Jewish group, and demonstrating a community of interests with the 
Roman prefect.  
This analysis points to an urban sociology that would explain 
ethnic division in the city. I argue that small groups (associations), 
which probably were difficult for Jews to join, were integrated into 
larger political and social institutions and groups. These formed 
networks that incorporated the Alexandrian elite. We can trace the 
influence of such networks as far as the imperial court. Modern 
parallels suggest that such networks were important in everyday 
life, providing the social resources and political access necessary to 
negotiate the contingencies of the everyday. Even in modern 
instances, it is difficult to trace the flows of resources through such 
networks, since presumably both tangibles (financial resources) and 
intangibles (status, influence, and protection) were involved. The 
informality of such networks is crucial to their social and political 
functions.  
Our modern examples illustrate the potential for such networks 
to break down. Political failure or even just political uncertainty 
could act as a propulsion mechanism to violence. In such instances, 
ethnicity might become a convenient marker of friends and 
enemies. Such an identification establishes a rationale for ethnic 
exclusion and a shared interest between elite and non-elite in the 
public and violent demonstration of such exclusion. Civil violence 
then becomes performative and instrumental in establishing and 
enforcing boundaries. Such a pathway to violence exploits pre-
existing differences but uses ethnicity instrumentally.  
People killed their neighbours not because of a dispute over 
citizenship nor because of a deep-seated ethnic hostility. It was a 
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bid for power and resources consequential on a political breakdown 
in 38 CE. The violence gave members of the violent group political 
authority. Once the ethnic-political boundaries had been drawn, 
bringing the city back together became difficult and the scene was 
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